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INSANITY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT- OF COMMITTEE "A" OF THE INSTITUTE
EDWIN

R. KEEDY, Chairman.

This committee was created at the second meeting of the Institute, held in Washington, D. C., in 1910, under a resolution which
provided for th appointment of a committee "to investigate the insane
offender with a view, first, to ascertain how the existing legal rules of
criminal responsibility can be adjusted to the conclusions of modern
medical science and modern penal science, and secondly, to devise such
amendments in the mode of legal proceedings as will best realize these
principles and avoid current abuses." It will be noticed that the scope
of the committee is limited to the case of the "insane" as distinguished
from the "mentally defective" offender, and further that "the existing legal rules of criminal responsibility" are to be taken as the basis
for all proposals There is a wide difference between mental defect
and insanity or mental disease, and each must be considered separately
in its relation to criminal responsibility. It is only within very recent
years that a careful study and classification of mental defectives have
been made, and the problem of determining the legal responsibility of
such persons has not as yet been fairly faced.
Regarding the question of criminal responsibility it must always be
borne in mind that this is a legal question. Criminal responsibility
means accountability according to the requirements of the criminal
law, which determines what acts shall constitute crimes and establishes
the essential elements of these crimes. According to our law the test
of responsibility in all offenses except a small group of mild wrongs,
which may be described as public torts and prohibitions within the
police power, is the existence of mens rea or criminal mind, often
called criminal intent. The problem for this committee accordingly
has been to frame a provision that is based upon this fundamental
principle of the criminal law, and at the same time is consistent with
the established theories of the medical profession regarding mental
disease. The difficulty with the present law relating to insanity is
that it prescribes tests of responsibility which are not in accord with
general principles of law and has incorporated into itself obsolete medical views of mental disease.
In 1911 this committee tentatively proposed the draft of a bill
providing:
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First. A test of criminal responsibility when insanity is let up as
a defense.
Second. The procedure for determining this, and
Third. The disposition to be made of one who has been found
to be insane so as not to be unusually responsible'
This draft after much discussion was slightly amended the following year, and was again tentatively reported in the following form:
Sec. 1. No person, suffering from mental disease, shall hereafter be convicted of any criminal charge, when at the time of the
act or omission alleged against him, he did not have, by reason of
such mental disease or derangement, the particular state of mind which
must accompany such act or omission in order to constitute the crime
charged.
Sec. 2. Where in any indictment or information any act or omission is charged against any person as an offense, and it is given in
evidence on the trial of such person for that offense that he was
mentally diseased so as not to be responsible, according to the preceding section, for his acts or omissions, at the time when the act or
omission charged, was made, then if it appears to the jury before
whom such person is tried that he did the act or made the omission
charged, but by reason of his mental disease was not responsible according to the preceding section, the jury shall return a special verdict
that the accused did the act or made the omission charged against him
but was not legally responsible, by reason of his mental disease, at
the time he did the act or made the omission.
Sec. 3. When such special verdict is found, the court shall remand the prisoner to the custody of the proper officer and shall immediately order an inquisition by the proper persons to determine
whether the prisoner is now suffering from such a mental disease as
to be a menace to the public health or safety. If the members of the
inquisition find that such person is a public menace, then the judge
shall order that such mentally diseased person be committed to the state
hospital for the insane, to be confined there until he shall have fully
recovered from such mental disease. If the jury find that the prisoner
is not suffering from a mental disease as aforesaid, then he shall be
immediately discharged from custody.
Sec. 4. When a person suffering from a mental disease shall
have been committed to the state hospital for the insane in accordance
with the provisions of the preceding section, no writ of habeas corpus
shall be issued for the release of such person on the ground that he is
no longer mentally diseased, unless the petitioner for such writ pre-

EDWIN R. KEEDY

sents sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of mental soundness on the part of the person confined as aforesaid.
Sec. 5. An appeal from a final order, discharging a person committed to a state hospital for the insane in accordance with section
three (3) of this aft, may be taken in the name of the state by the
attorney-general or the district attorney.
Since that time the proposal has been elaborately discussed and
commented upon in legal periodicals and judicial opinion. It has also
been compared with the proposals of other organizations and has been
subjected to searching criticism by the advocates of these other proposals. So well has the proposal withstood criticism that the committee, already convinced of its logical soundness and practical workableness, now feels itself in a position to present the measure in final
form. The last two sections of the original proposal relating to the
writ of habeas corpus and appeal from commitment order are withdrawn as it is believed they are not closely enough connected with the
main features of the plan to be included in the same bill. Several
changes in phrasing, which are considered improvements, have been
made. Your committee presents as its final report on this point the
following draft, which the Institute is asked to approve:
Sec. 1. No person shall hereafter be convicted of any criminal
charge, when at the time of the act or omission alleged against him
he was suffering from mental disease and by reason of such mental
disease he did not have the particular state of mind which must accompany such act or omission in order to constitute the crime charged.
Sec. 2. When in any indictment or information any act or omission is charged against any person as an offense, and it is given in evidence on the trial of such person for that offense that he was mentally
diseased at the time when he did the-act or made the omission charged,
then if the jury before whom such person is tried concludes that he
did the act or made the omission charged, but by reason of his mental
disease was not responsible according to the preceding section, then the
jury shall return a special verdict that the accused did the act or made
the omission charged against him but was not at the time legally
responsible, by reason of his mental disease.
Sec. 3.- When such special verdict is found, the court shall remand
the prisoner to the custody of [the proper officer]' and shall immediately order an inquisition by [the proper persons]' to determine whether

I When this bill is introduced in the legislature of any state, the titles of
the persons, whose duty it is, according to the law of the state, to conduct
an inquisition, shall be inserted here, as it is not proposed to change the prevailing practice in this respect.
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the prisoner is at that time suffering from a mental disease so as to
be a menace to the public safety If the members of the inquisition
find that such person is mentally diseased as aforesaid, then the judge
shall order that such person be committed to the state hospital for
the insane, to be confined there until he shall have so far recovered
from such mental disease as to be no longer a menace to the public
safety. If they find that the prisoner is not suffering from mental
disease as aforesaid, then he shall be immediately discharged from
custody.
The proposed measure establishes a direct relation between criminal responsibility and mental disease. As has already been stated,
the standard of responsibility in practically all cases is the existence of
the criminal mind, as defined by law, at the time of the doing of the
wrongful act. Any fact which negatives this state of mind removes
one of the requisites for conviction. Mistake of fact, for instance, is
a good defense, when by reason of it the defendant did not have the
guilty mind at the time of his act. Consequently the provision now
under discussion is seen to be in strict accord with a fundamental
principle of the criminal law.
The proposed provision is also consistent with the present views
of the medical profession regarding mental disease, for it does not
limit the defense to any particular form or symptoms of mental disease, and does not attempt to draw the line between sanity and insanity. Psychiatrists and psychologists no longer regard insanity as
a definite, clearly defined state, with a sharp line of cleavage separating it from sanity, but simply as mental unsoundness which may be
as varied in its forms, degrees, and symptoms as physical ill health.
Under this proposal the expert witness would not be required to state
categorically whether' the defendant was sane or insane at the time
of the alleged crime, but would be asked to state the symptoms of his
disease. The judge would then describe to the jury the state of mind
which is involved in the crime charged, and the jury would then
determine whether the defendant, by reason of the mental symptoms
enumerated by the witness, had the particular state of mind described
by the judge. It would not be necessary for the axpert witness or
the judge to use technical terms in performing their respective functions and as a result the jury would have less difficulty than at present
in reaching an intelligent and appropriate verdict.
According to the proposed plan, in case the jury find that the defendant did not have the necessary criminal mind by reason of his
mental disease, they will return a verdict to this effect, and the court
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will then order an inquisition to determine whether the defendant is
then suffering from a mental disease so as to be a menace to the
public health and safety. If the jury so find, then the judge will commit him to a hospital for the insane. The issue in this second inquiry
into the defendant's mental condition is necessarily different from the
first. Then the question was whether he was guilty of a crime committed in the past; now the question is whether he is a safe person to
be at large.
Under our present law on the subject df insanity the question is
whether the defendant by reason of his mental disease shall be held
not responsible to the law for the injury he has done. There is another
question which is almost equally important, and that is whether a
mental disease, although not of sufficient degree to relieve entirely from
responsibility, may not be held to lessen the degree of the crime. For
instance, may not a person charged with'murder escape conviction for
that offense because by reason of his mental disease he did not have
the malice aforethought, but be found to have enough mens rea to be
guilty of manslaughter? This doctrine of partial responsibility has
been adopted by some continental countries and has earnest advocates
here. The Supreme Court of Utah in a decision rendered last year
applied this doctrine. (State v. Anselmo, 148 Pac. 1071.)
If the
proposal of the committee be accepted, partial responsibility follows
as a logical conclusion

Although the subject of expert testimony was not included in the
original scope of this committee, yet as it plays such an important
part in the trial of cases where insanity is set up as a defense, and is
so often regarded as productive of miscarriages of justice in such
cases, it was decided that the solution of this problem should also be
undertaken. Accordingly in 1914 the following draft was submitted
to the Institute, and was unanimously approved:
Sec. 1. Summoning of Witnesses by Court. Where the existence
of mental disease or derangement on the part of any person becomes
an issue in the trial of a case, the judge of the trial court may summon
one or more disinterested qualified experts, not exceeding three, to
testify at the trial. In case the judge shall issue the summons before
the trial is begun, he shall notify counsel for both parties of the
witnesses so summoned. Upon the trial of the case, the witnesses
summoned by the court may be cross-examined by counsel for both
parties in the case. Such summoning of witnesses by the court shall
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not preclude either party from using other expert witnesses at the
trial.
Sec. 2. Exanzination, of Accused by State's Witnesses In criminal cases, no testimony regarding the mental condition of the accused
shall be received from witnesses summoned by the accused until the
expert witnesses summoned by the prosecution have been given an
opporunity to examine the accused.
Sec. 3. Commitment to Hospital for Observation. Whenever in
the trial of a criminal case the existence of mental disease on the part
of the accused, either at the time of the trial or at the time of the
commission of the alleged wrongful act, becomes an issue in the case,
the judge of the court before whom the accused is to be tried or is
being tried shall commit the accused to the State Hospital for the Insane, to be detained there for purposes of observation until further
order of court The court shall direct the superintendent of the hospital to permit all the expert witnesses summoned in the case to have
free access to the accused for purposes of observation The court-may
also direct the chief physician of the hospital to prepare a report regarding the mental condition of the accused. This report may be
introduced in evidence at the trial under the oath of said chief physician, who may be cross-examined regarding the report by counsel
for both sides.
Sec. 4. Written Report by Witness. Each expert witness may
prepare a written report upon the mental condition of the person in
question, and such report may be read by the witness at the trial. If
the witness presenting the report was called by one of the opposing
parties, he may be cross-examined regarding his report by counsel for
the other party. If the witness was summoned by the court, he may be
cross-examined regarding his report by counsel for both parties.
Sec. 5. Consultation of Witnesses. Where expert witnesses have
examined the person whose mental condition is an element in the case,
they may consult with or without the direction of the court, and if
possible, prepare a joint report to be introduced at the trial.
This bill was also approved by the Conference on Medical Legislation of the American Medical Association, and with the exception
of the third section, by the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the American Bar Association. The bill as approved by the
Institute was introduced in several legislative bodies, and was freely
discussed there. The committee is now of the opinion that the bill
in its present form is too comprehensive, and includes several sections
not closely enough connected with the main provisions of the bill.
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Three sections apply both to criminal and civil cases. The section on
commitment of an accused person to a hospital for observation, though
important in itself is rather foreign to provisions relating exclusively
to expert witnesses. In addition to this, section 2, which provides
that the accused shall not be permitted to introduce expert testimony
unless he submits to an examination by the prosecution's witnesses,
is extremely doubtful from a constitutional point of view. Accordingly the committee has decided to limit the scope of sections one and
four to criminal cases and to ask that these sections be approved independently of the others. Several verbal changes have been made in
section 1 and section 4, which now becomes section 2. The bill is now
presented in the following form, which the Institute is requested to
approve:
Sec. 1. Summoning of Witnesses by Court. Whenever in the
trial of a criminal case the issue of insanity on the part of the defendant is raised, the judge of the trial court may call one or more
disinterested qualified experts, not exceeding three, to testify at the
trial, and if the judge does so, he shall notify counsel of the witnesses
so called, giving their names and addresses. Upon the trial of the
case, the'witnesses called by the court may be examined regarding
their qualifications and their testimony by counsel for the prosecution
and defense. Such calling of witnesses by the court shall not preclude
the prosecution or defense from calling other expert witnesses at the
trial. The witnesses called by the judge shall be allowed such fees
as in the discretion of the judge seem just and reasonable, having
regard to the services performed by the witihesses. The fees so allowed shall be paid by the county where the indictment was found.
Sec. 2. Written Report by Witnesses. When the issue of insanity has been raised'in a criminal case each expert witness, who has
examined or observed the defendant, may prepare a written report
regarding the mental condition of the defendant based upon such examination or observation, and such report may be read by the witness
at the trial after being duly sworn. The written report prepared by
the witness shall be submitted by him to counsel for either party before being read to the jury, if request for this is made to the court by
counsel. If the witness presenting the report was called by the prosecution or defense, he may be cross-examined regarding his report by
counsel for the other party. If the witness was called by the court,
he may be examined regarding his report by counsel for the .prosecution and defense.
One member of the committee, Dr. Prince, is strongly of the
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opinion that section 3 should be approved as an integral part of one
of the two proposals submitted to the Institute.
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